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“We often assume that these frontiers of science will benefit only the richer nations of the 
world, …[But] [i]n fact resource-poor settings can actually drive innovation, demanding 
ingenious product designs that are less expensive, and easier to use, and require less 
infrastructure. It is also easier to disrupt the technological status quo in the absence of 
entrenched commercial interests organised around existing products” (Elias, 2006: 540) 
 
“By and large, disruptive technology is initially embraced by the least profitable 
customers in a market” (Christenson, 1990: xvii) 
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1.  Introduction 
 
However pressing the distributional concerns of redressing inequality and overcoming 
poverty are in the short-run, in the long run meeting the development needs of 
humankind requires economic growth. This much is indisputable, although the 
composition of this growth - the weight given to different social and environmental 
parameters - is of course subject to contestation. Growth can arise from one or a 
combination of two different sources – an increase in the amount of investment applied 
to production (“extensive growth”), and an improvement in the quality of this investment 
(“intensive growth”). Most rapidly-growing economies draw on both the extensive and 
intensive margins. But, increasingly through the last three centuries, and inevitably even 
more so in the coming centuries as global resources are depleted, the focus of attention 
has been, and will be, placed on the intensive margin. And as we now have also 
realised, innovation and technological change lie at the centre of investment quality and 
therefore at the root of growth and development agendas. It was not always so. In the 
early part of the 20th century as far as most analysts were concerned, the capacity of 
economic systems to produce more over time simply took place. And if it was 
determined by anything it was by the rate of investment i.e. by the rate of addition to the 
stock of capital within the economic system under consideration.  
 
This tradition was placed in question by a remarkable study carried out in 1956. Using 
conventional comparative static techniques, Robert Solow (1957) attempted to provide a 
statistical explanation of the causes of US manufacturing growth over the period 1911-
56. He concluded that only around 12.5% of the observed growth of labour productivity 
(output per worker) over this period could be 'explained' by increments in the stock of 
capital, the remaining 87.5% being a 'residual' or an unexplained 'technological change' 
or  ‘improvement in productivity'. What was significant about this study was that a major 
economic magnitude (the rate of economic growth) could not apparently be explained by 
the established causal variable. It was not so much the rate of investment that was 
important but rather the productivity of investment – and that remained unexplained. 
From that point on the growth agenda became one of identifying what these causal 
factors might be and clearly an important one was investment in science and 
technology.1 In turn of course issues of science policy then became strategic since 
science was concerned above all with the creation of new knowledge much of this 
presumably economically useful. 
 
The link with the agenda for underdevelopment was just as significant since underlying 
all international poverty and inequality were poor economic conditions. It was this above 
all that gave rise to the drafting of the Sussex Manifesto by a group of policy-oriented 
social scientists at the Science Policy Research Unit and the Institute of Development 
Studies at Sussex University (Singer et. al., 1970). The Sussex Manifesto (hereafter, 
SM) reflected best-practice thinking at the time, and has continued to frame (or perhaps 
reflect) the dominant mode of thinking about, and the patterns of organising science 
policy in, and for, low income economies. It is a model which overwhelmingly focuses on 
science and technology as the primary source of technological change and the 
historically high-income northern economies as the primary locus of new technology and 
innovation. It has also tended statistically to conflate S&T with R&D expenditure. 
 
                                            
1
 S&T was not the only one. Authors such as Denison (1962) investigated others such as entrepreneurship, 
education and scale factors. 
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However, in recent years there have been major structural changes in processes of 
innovation, and in thinking about innovation processes. Little of this has filtered through 
to the development community which continues to run on old tramlines. In this paper we 
briefly review the old model (Section 2) and then focus on the new currents of thinking 
and practice about innovation, so-called Mode 2 innovation (Section 3). This is followed 
in Section 4 by a discussion of a series of emerging and outlier trends in innovation in 
various global settings. These trends offer the possibility for developing economies of 
disrupting dominant power relations in innovation, and also of better meeting the needs 
of the poor. This leads us in Section 5 to identify the potentially key role played by an 
innovation surge in the Asian Driver economies, and its potential relevance to meeting 
developmental needs in other low income economies.  In this final section we also note 
however some outstanding science policy questions and the importance of keeping 
these questions alive in policy debates. 
 
 
2.  Running On Tram-Lines: Best Practice In Development-Centred Innovation 
 
In bringing innovation to the centre of the development discussion, the SM identified the 
importance of science and technology (hereafter S&T) in raising economy-wide 
productivity and output – “The underlying problem arises from the international division 
of labour in science and technology and the present massive orientation of world 
scientific effort to the problems and objectives of interest principally to the advanced 
countries” (SM, p 1). The Manifesto argued that inherent weaknesses of low income 
economies with regard to S&T were exacerbated by the external brain-drain of skill 
migration to high income economies. There was also an “internal brain-drain” as 
domestic S&T systems, largely public financed, were modelled on advanced country 
institutions. As a result high-level human and capital resources were wastefully built-up 
with little impact on local economic systems. 
 
A number of solutions were proposed to meet these problems – developing countries 
should raise their R&D expenditure to 0.5 percent of GDP; the advanced countries 
should support R&D in low income economies, including by providing aid, and orienting 
at least five percent of their own R&D to meeting the needs of developing countries; a 
technology transfer bank should be established to widen the shelf of existing 
technologies available to producers in low income economies. All of this, argued the SM, 
should be accompanied by appropriate institutional change within and outside the S&T 
system in developing economies. In offering this analysis of the shortfall in the nature 
and extent of technology development for low income economies, the SM closely 
reflected a new type of thinking about technology development in the advanced 
countries although the point about “institutional change” was never really taken on 
board. Thus the SM concentrated on R&D in research and technology organisations 
(RTOs) as the major source of innovation. Most of these RTOs, and the accompanying 
R&D, were in the public sector.  
 
In the subsequent decades since the SM was written this focus on R&D  has been 
reflected in increasing R&D investments by low income economy governments and the 
international community to meet the needs of low income countries. Table 1 shows the 
extent of investment in R&D in such economies. The SM had estimated that at the end 
of the 1960s, only approximately two percent of global R&D occurred in the developing 
economies. Two decades later, this ratio had risen to 10 percent, and by 2000, more 
than one-fifth of global R&D was located in the developing world. In aggregate, at 0.9% 
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of GDP in 2000, the commitment by developing economies to R&D expenditure was 
almost double the SM target. To some extent this strong performance overestimated real 
achievements, since in 1970 the centrally planned economies were excluded from these 
calculations, and in later decades much of the growth in developing economy R&D was 
located in the Asian Tigers. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that in many 
developing economies – including, but not limited to large economies such as China, 
India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa - investments in R&D have grown significantly 
over the past four decades.  
 
Table 1. Developing countries in Global R&D 
 
 c1970 1990 2000 
Share of global R&D 
($PPP) (%) 
2.0 10.2 21.0 
R&D as % GDP NA 0.7 0.9 
Coverage Excluding centrally 
planned 
Including centrally planned and 
NIC economies 
 
Source: 1970 - Sussex Manifesto, 1970; 1990 and 2000 - UIS Bulletin on Science and 
Technology Statistics, Issue No 1, 2004, cited in M. Bell, 2007 
 
These internal commitments to R&D expansion in developing countries were 
complemented by significant progress in the level of resources devoted by the 
international community to S&T directed at low income economy needs. In addition to 
widespread support for the expansion of tertiary education in the developing world, the 
most notable investments in global RTOs focused on the developing world occurred 
within the framework of the CGIAR family of research centres with particular relevance to 
agriculture. Despite problems in the architecture of these institutions, they did have some 
major early successes, most notably in the case of the green revolution. However, whilst 
the original CG centres did well in selected mandated crops they did so under particular 
conditions and contexts. Since the early 1980s they do not seem to have achieved 
similar levels of success, and they are now under some threat (Hall et al, 2003). 
 
Despite this increase in commitments to R&D, the development of innovation capacity in 
many low income economies has been poor. Many developing countries do not seem to 
have been able to avoid the very problem that the SM was trying to avoid – the waste of 
resources arising from what the SM referred to as “the internal brain drain”. Technology 
development continues to rely on inputs from the industrially advanced economies and is 
often inappropriate to the needs of low income consumers and operating environments 
with poor infrastructure. The shortfall of these innovation processes with respect to 
meeting the health problems concentrated in developing economies (Malaria, HIV-
positivity, TB) is increasingly widely-recognised, and being confronted (with varying 
degrees of success) within the context of the Global Fund, the Gates Foundation and 
other initiatives (Chataway et al, 2007, Moran, 2005). In agriculture there are still too 
many examples of local agribusiness bypassing local S&T systems and relying on 
foreign sources of technology to provide up-to-date innovation responses (Keskin et al, 
2008) 
   
An important divergence from the SM-inspired orthodoxy during the 1970s and 1980s 
was the appropriate technology (AT) movement. Schumacher’s original concerns with 
inappropriateness in process (and particularly with the capital-intensity of innovation) 
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built on the observed limited range of efficient production techniques (Schumacher, 
1973; Eckaus, 1955; Stewart, 1979; Clark, 1985). Subsequently the recognition of the 
limited range of efficient process technologies was complemented by a focus on the 
limited range of efficient product technologies (Lancaster, 1966), and the fixity between 
process and product technologies (Langdon, 1981). For some years the AT movement 
flourished (Jequier, 1976; Carr, 1985; Kaplinsky, 1990), but essentially it remained a by-
water of dissent and limited change, rather than a full-blooded counter-response to the 
hegemony of an R&D based innovative drive centred in the high income economies. 
Nevertheless, despite this recognition of the inadequacy of innovation proposed by the 
SM, in some important respects the AT was a victim itself of the same weakness. It 
tended to emphasise “hard technologies” as the solution, a technology-fix not dissimilar 
to the supply-based R&D agendas of the SM model.2  
 
In the light of these problems, and given the persistent levels of poverty that continue to 
exist we believe there is a need to give urgent policy attention to processes of innovation 
which are efficient and appropriate for low income developing economies. There is still a 
large body of opinion that would simply increase the levels of expenditure on R&D 
targeted at, and in, countries with low per capita incomes3. However, since the SM was 
written, much has changed in the structure of best-practice innovation in the 
industrialised countries, suggesting that business-as-we-know-it/running-along-the-
same-tramlines may no longer be appropriate. Yet in many respects perspectives on 
innovation and R&D in many developing country contexts still faithfully reflect the 
worldview of the SM (Bell, 2005, 2006 & 2007; Hall 2005; Clark, 2002, 2009). New ways 
of thinking about innovation appear so far to have had little impact.  
 
We believe that these changes are so significant that it forces us to think about 
developing country innovation in very different ways. But before considering these policy 
implications, in Sections 3 and 4 we highlight some of the major changes which have 
been, and continue to take place in the environment in which innovation occurs, and 
consequently in the architecture of innovation practices. 
 
 
3.  Mode 2 Innovation: New Currents In The Innovation Stream 
 
(i) New Industrial Paradigm 
 
A key development in the structure of innovation processes can be traced back to the 
transformation in industrialised country markets during the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
Until then, the focus on economic growth had been on enhancing the supply response 
following WW2 and then the Korean War. This was essentially an environment of 
constrained supply in an era in which per capita incomes were not much different to 
those in current middle-income economies. It was a world characterised by relatively 
limited product diversity, thus allowing for economies in scale in production utilising 
                                            
2
 Although more recently there have been moves to place the AT debate within an innovation systems 
analysis. See Hall et al (2007) 
3
 Good examples of this can be found in Lipton (1988) and Pardey et al (1997). In the latter the authors 
provide a detailed account of the decline in African agricultural research spending but there is virtually no 
analysis of why this has happened. Consequently the final conclusion focusing on the need to increase 
finance is unconvincing. The Lipton paper goes further in linking declining research expenditures to falling 
economic rates of return but the analysis virtually ignores institutional questions, concentrating instead on 
poor policy frameworks, below optimum size of research stations and product relevance. 
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inflexible dedicated equipment and hierarchical labour processes. This production 
paradigm has variously been referred to as mass production or Fordism and was 
extensively chronicled by Piore and Sabel, Best and others (Piore and Sabel, 1984; 
Best, 1990). 
 
Two trends eroded the efficacy of this system of mass production (Kaplinsky, 1994). 
First, in a context of rising per capita incomes, consumers who were offered the choice 
were no longer satisfied by homogenous consumption goods. A premium was paid for 
variety and quality, and markets became increasingly segmented and volatile as 
producers developed the capacity to develop and exploit new niches. Second, 
hierarchical labour processes with sharp divides between skilled and unskilled labour, 
working in large scale production environments, became increasingly alienated. Strikes 
grew in importance throughout the high income economies, absenteeism was high and 
quality and attention to detail in machine-paced assembly was low. Wastage was high, 
and the costs of inventories and logistics in “just-in-case” production systems 
characterised by large inventories were burdensome (Feigenbaum, 1991),  
 
It is in this context that the new production paradigm’s efficiency is to be seen. Piore and 
Sabel 1984) recount two alternative forms of new production system – the flexible craft-
based systems prevalent in the industrial districts of Italy, and the just-in-time and 
flexible production systems developed in Japan.4 It was the latter development which 
has come to play the dominant role in the emergence of a new innovation paradigm. 
Initially developed in Toyota (Monden, 1983; Cusumano, 1985) and then rapidly 
spreading to other sectors in Japan and globally (Womack and Jones,1996) – including 
to developing countries, Kaplinsky, 1994) – this new post-florist/flexible 
specialisation/lean production paradigm rapidly asserted its competitiveness.  
 
This supremacy was evident in a number of respects. It provided for increased flexibility 
and diversity, exemplified currently by the Zara clothing retail chain which changes its 
product offering every week. By reducing defects and wastage, and especially by 
thinning inventory lines and producing to order rather than to forecast, it was also 
significantly cost-saving – Dell’s make-to-order offering is now widely replicated across 
industries. Crucially it also led to fundamental changes in the nature of work and the 
organisation of firms and value chains. If a single phrase were to sum up the innovation 
challenge provided by this new production paradigm, it is one of enhanced clock-speed 
(Stalk and Hout, 1990).  
 
Toyota’s advance to supremacy in the global auto sector reflects its mastery of lean 
production. It achieves high levels of quality, and couples this with rapid product 
innovation, excellent price-quality trade-offs, and thin-inventories. It is widely-copied 
across industries. Critically, the new production paradigm is not confined to 
manufacturing – global agricultural-to-retail value chains, coordinated by retail giants 
such as Walmart and Tesco illustrate the generic nature of the competitiveness of this 
new system of innovation and production (Womack and Jones, 1996) and the new 
paradigm has even been implemented in hospital design (Kaplinsky, 1995). 
 
A number of features of this production paradigm reflected a sharp divergence from the 
model implicit in the SM. In the first place, Toyota distinguished between big changes 
                                            
4
 Piore and Sabel's particular “take” on the new production paradigm was to characterise it as a system of 
flexible specialisation, highlighting the combination of segmented markets and rapid product differentiation 
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(“kaikaku”) and small incremental changes (“kaizen”) (Womack and Jones, 1996). The 
R&D and S&T approach to technology development was very much in the mould of 
kaikaku. But in reality, Toyota and its followers were able to show that the cumulative 
effect of a myriad of small changes within the production and design process added up 
to rapid and significant changes.5 These changes are referred to as “kaizen”, continuous 
improvement, and result from active participation by the labour force in making 
suggestions for improvement in process and product (Imai, 1987). The numbers of these 
suggestions from the labour force – requiring, by the way, a shift from the single-tasking 
and single skilling Taylorist division of labour in mass production – were staggering. In 
the early 1990s, Nissan garnered more than six million suggestions from its labour force 
annually, around 77 from each worker per year (Kaplinsky, 1994). The critical 
distinguishing features of kaizen were their incremental nature, their frequency and, 
crucially in contra-distinction to the SM paradigm, the fact that they overwhelming 
emanated from shop floor workers. Scientists, R&D and S&T – the backbone of the 
inherited model – were conspicuous by their absence. This is not, of course to say that 
Toyota makes no attempt at kaikaku innovations. It is at the forefront of hybrid autos, 
electrically-powered cars and sophisticated R&D intensive engine management systems. 
But it integrates these within an institutional context that is quite different from the 
traditional one. 
 
A second distinguishing feature of innovation in the lean production paradigm is its 
interdisciplinarity and in-parallel nature. This is exemplified by the ability which Toyota 
and other Japanese automakers have developed to reduce the design cycle for a new 
car from more than eight years to less than 18 months. This was achieved by the 
introduction of cross-functional design teams – a mix of disciplines and functions – and 
having them work in parallel, rather than in sequence. This is referred to as “concurrent 
engineering”. In the previous paradigm, there was a strict sequence of specialisation and 
temporal separation in the design and development cycle, with each function working on 
its task only when the previous function had completed and passed on its work. An 
important component of these concurrent engineering teams is that the end-actors in the 
production chain – marketing and sales – are included in these teams to ensure that the 
products are pulled by customer demand, rather than pushed by the imperatives of 
supply.6  
 
The third distinguishing feature of the lean production paradigm led on directly from this. 
Concurrent engineering practices were extended from the different functions within the 
firm to the different links within the value chain. Systemic efficiency thus required close 
interaction across the spectrum of firms involved in the chain. Crucially, governance by 
lead firms was required to coordinate this innovation cycle which increasingly involved 
high-trust relations between firms without the cement of internalisation through dominant 
equity holdings (Sako, 1992). 
 
As described, this new paradigm involved close interaction between innovation and 
production. There was no clear separation of the innovation process as an “S&T” activity 
driven by R&D by highly skilled scientists and technologists. This of course is not to say 
                                            
5
 The importance of incremental technical change had, at the micro level, been demonstrated for some time 
in the industrially advanced countries (Hollander, 1965), as well as in developing economies (Katz, 1987). 
But the significance of this micro-level of change had been little noticed, either in innovation theory or in 
institutional design. 
6
 Similar principles were reflected in the transition from just-in-case inventory push systems in mass 
production to just-in-time pull systems in lean production (Womack and Jones,  1996; Kaplinsky, 1995) 
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that there was no S&T or R&D content, but rather that these were often subsumed in, 
and integrated with the design and production and marketing functions within and 
between firms. This point has recently been emphasised in Bell’s recent report to 
UNCTAD (2007) on overseas development assistance. Based upon of detailed empirical 
analysis over the last 50 years or so he argues that successful technology development 
is largely enterprise-based and relies on “public sector science” only to a limited extent. 
R&D is important of course but it is not where innovation mainly takes place and it is 
innovation, not R&D that really drives possibilities for poverty reduction. 
 
Take for example industrial activity. It really does not matter whether you are considering 
a cassava processing plant in Ghana or a deep water petroleum facility off the coast of 
Angola. In either case the investment activities associated with any new venture will 
follow roughly the same rules. The firm will determine the macroeconomic and 
government regulatory context, specify the process and product design, the ancillary 
facilities such as power and water supply, the necessary financial and due diligence 
components, and associated contracting and sub-contracting arrangements for its 
engineering. Management of the package is a highly skill-intensive process and one that 
takes time. It will of course hopefully embed the latest knowledge as a necessary 
condition but in practice every project is a new project and it is in this process of “getting 
it right” that much of the necessary learning and innovation takes place. Bell also shows 
that in general the resources needed here are many multiples of basic and applied 
“research rich countries costs.” It is in the doing of it that knowledge is expanded. And 
this is where the private sector is so successful. No enterprise would tolerate the levels 
of economic inefficiency routinely exhibited by public sector science. It could not afford 
to.7 
 
(ii) From Mode 1 to Mode 2 
 
A second factor that has begun to influence the innovation debate is the concept of 
Mode 2 science introduced by Gibbons and his colleagues in a book published in 19948. 
Ever since the publication of the Rothschild report on UK science policy in 19719 which 
introduced the notion of the “customer-contractor” relationship into government R&D 
expenditure policy,10 there had been an implicit realisation that bureaucratic separation 
of “science” from “economic production” was an inefficient way of managing resources. 
Indeed this view probably goes back even further to the famous Reith lecture of C P 
Snow in the late 1950s11. By the 1990s there had arisen a whole series of institutional 
changes designed to tie public investment in “science” to stated welfare objectives. Good 
examples of this were the creation of the UK Biotechnology Directorate in 1980, the UK 
DTI Link scheme of the 1990s and the establishment of Foresight Exercises in many 
countries during the 1980s and 1990s. Common to all of these “institutional innovations” 
was the realisation that the search for and validation of knowledge needed to involve a 
much wider body of stakeholder interests and capacities than had been the conventional 
case. Not only had R&D expenditures become merely a part of the story but also the 
funding activities of research councils and other donors were struggling to give this 
operational meaning in practice. 
                                            
7
 See also Bell (2005) 
8
 See Gibbons et al (1994) 
9
 See Rothschild (1971) 
10
 Similar developments began in other high income economies but we have used the UK for illustrative 
purposes 
11
 See Snow (1963) 
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The concept of Mode 2 innovation was developed to characterise and theorise this 
transition in innovation paradigm, and to contrast this against the inherited Mode 1 
model implicit in the S&T-R&D science-push approach implicit in the SM (Gibbons et. al., 
1994). In the words of Nowotny et al (2003) its broad thesis was that 
 
“the old paradigm of scientific discovery (Mode 1) characterised by the hegemony of 
disciplinary science, with its strong sense of an internal hierarchy between the 
disciplines and driven by the autonomy of scientists and their host institutions, the 
universities, was being superseded – although not replaced - by a new paradigm 
(Mode 2) which was socially distributed, application-oriented, trans-disciplinary and 
subject to multiple accountabilities”.12 
 
The argument is both positive (this is what is actually taking place) and normative (it 
represents an opportunity to improve best practice) and has caused considerable debate 
within scientific and related communities. The essential characteristics of Mode 2 
knowledge may be summarised as follows: 
 
• It is generated within the context of application and not solely through scientific 
experiment 
• It is essentially trans-disciplinary and not solely reducible to the outputs of single 
disciplines 
• It is developed within and across widely different organisational forms 
• It is “reflexive” in the sense that it is not reducible to an objective investigation of 
“natural law” but is rather a dialogue between research actors and subjects 
• Quality is controlled not only by scientific peer review but also by other actors 
including research “clients” 
• Issues of policy, commercialisation (including intellectual property rights) and 
accountability are now very much to fore in corresponding science management 
 
What this adds up to is that the framing context in which knowledge 
generation/validation takes place has changed. Even where S&T and R&D intensity is 
necessitated by the knowledge-intensive nature of technologies, the capacity of 
technology suppliers to determine the innovation agenda has been curbed. Instead, 
research efforts are steered by demanding providers of finance, by important 
intermediary bodies like banks and NGOs and by the needs of users. Researchers are 
increasingly accountable to a progressively more complex array of stakeholder groups 
and operate in a context of deepening globalisation. At the same time, and reflecting the 
reigning-in of the pursuit of knowledge for knowledge’s sake, there has been an 
increasing tendency for knowledge generation to be privately appropriated rather than 
being seen as a public good 
 
In this context, Mode 2 innovation has different characteristics. First, the emphasis on 
usefulness and application has meant that knowledge is developed in the context of use 
rather than as a process detached from production and consumption. Firms, and groups 
of firms, become a primary locus of innovation (Bell, 2007). Secondly, the innovation 
agenda is increasingly trans-disciplinary and much of the requisite knowledge is tacit, 
and held in teams and routines rather than stored as abstract and codified information. 
                                            
12
 See Nowotny et al (2003), p 15 
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Third, many more players are incorporated in the innovation cycle – for example, 
workers, NGOs, banks, firms in a value chain and users, as well as the “usual suspect” 
research and technology organisations (RTOs) and universities. And, finally, the 
innovation process is much more reflexive, involving an interaction (often in a number of 
iterations) between knowledge-producers and knowledge-users. 
 
It is this changing practice in innovation systems, involving systemic efficiency, in 
parallel-activities and a combination of big-jumps (“kaikaku” and small improvements 
(“kaizen”) which has come to dominate the innovation process in high-income 
economies. Sadly, little of this innovation-best-practice has filtered through to low income 
economies, who predominantly continue to see innovation as a process of big-pushes, 
driven by R&D in the S&T system. This leads to major anomalies in a number of 
contexts.   The development of a powerful pharmaceutical industry in India is a landmark 
in the history industrial development (Chataway, Kale and Wield, 2008) and had done 
much to provide cheap generic drugs to the world but has done little to address the 
needs of the poor in India.  Moreover, there is still the problem of how to invest science 
in relation of needs of the poor.  The investment in R&D for new drug development in 
India is heavily oriented to the needs of rich consumers in West mush as it is in large 
Western based MNCs. 
.  
So, clearly, much can be offered to speed up and make more relevant innovation 
systems in low-income economies. Mode 2 principles need to be applied but Mode 2 
principles are unlikely to entirely resolve the problem.. 
 
4.  Beyond Mode 2: New Consumers, Disruption And New Entrants 
 
If Mode 2 innovation systems offer significant benefits in low-income economy 
environments, to what extent does this meet the challenge of promoting development in 
these economies? The problem is that this wider diffusion of innovation systems will, at 
best, only help to arrest the growth in the innovation-divide between high- and low-
income economies. It does little to redress the global balance in innovation hegemony or 
to effectively meet the needs of very low income consumers, the “bottom billion” (Collier, 
2007). We have, therefore, to think beyond the Mode 1 - Mode 2 innovation divide, and 
to move into an arena which we term “below the radar innovation”.13 This builds on Mode 
2 practices, but goes beyond them to encompass new and disruptive forms of innovation 
which simultaneously meet the needs of a very different group of consumers, and 
potentially change the pecking-order currently governing global corporate and national 
hierarchies.  
 
In sketching-out this emerging pattern of below-the-radar-innovation (hereafter BRI) we 
begin by drawing on strands of new behaviour which are either relatively new, or whose 
significance has, hitherto, been under-recognised. We refer to this ensemble of 
developments as being “below the radar” since the collective significance of these new 
currents is only poorly recognised at present, not just by policy makers, but also by many 
of the core innovation systems which continue to plough an innovation path confident in 
their long-term supremacy as innovation leaders. We begin with a review of some 
relatively neglected concepts in the innovation systems literature (focusing on 
architectural systems and global value chains rather than on the national and regional 
innovation systems addressed in much of the innovation systems literature). We then 
                                            
13
 We are grateful to John Bessant for suggesting this terminology to us. 
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consider the emergence of new forms of demand-led innovation, before turning to the 
opportunities opened for profitable production by the rapid growth of low-income 
consumers in the global economy. 
 
4.1.  Innovation systems  
 
Initially put forward by economists such as Nelson and Freeman in the 1980s to explain 
the rapid economic growth of the so-called “newly industrialising countries” (NICs) over 
the latter part of the 20th century14 the use of innovation systems  has been extended 
and developed widely over the past decades.15 Originally the concept was developed to 
deal with the inability of conventional economic variables (such as capital investment 
and R&D expenditures) to explain differential rates of economic performance and to 
locate the role of knowledge among a much wider range of stakeholder groups than had 
previously been the case. The concept is now used as a kind of shorthand for the 
network of inter-organisational linkages that apparently successful countries have built 
up as a support system for economic production across the board. In this sense it has 
been explicitly recognised that economic creativity is actually about the quality of 
"technology linkages" and "knowledge flows" amongst and between a wide spectrum of 
economic agents. At least is has in relation to technology development in the high 
income economies. We shall return to rather different scenario for low income 
economies below. There are however two additional dimensions of innovation systems 
which are particularly relevant to BRI. The first of these is the distinction between 
component and architectural innovation, first highlighted in the early 1990s by 
Henderson and Clark. The components refer to the core modules of knowledge and 
capability. The architecture refers to the systemic way in which these components are 
combined. 
 
Henderson and Clark make the important point that core capabilities in particular 
components of capability involve routines – structures of governance, of information flow 
and of organisation (Henderson and Clark, 1990). They engender forms of path-
dependency (Dosi, 1982; Nelson, 1993) which may blind firms which possess valuable 
and complex competences in components from radically different ways of integrating 
these components - “[a]rchitectural innovation presents established firms with a more 
subtle challenge. Recognizing what is useful and what is not, and acquiring and applying 
new knowledge when necessary, may be quite difficult for an established firm because 
of the way knowledge – particularly architectural knowledge – is organized and 
managed” (Henderson and Clark, 1990: 404). This path dependency is not limited to the 
routines developed by individual links with competences in key core components. It 
applies equally to the design of the architectural system. The system itself, involving 
often long-lived relations of trust between key players in the chain, is also characterised 
by sticky and repeated forms of intra-system interaction, and their associated routines. 
 
A second important strand in systems-thinking which is relevant to BRI is that provided 
by global value chain analysis (Gereffi et al, 2005; Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001; 
http://www.globalvaluechains.org/). “The value chain describes the full range of activities 
which are required to bring a product or service from conception, through the different 
phases of production (involving a combination of physical transformation and the input of 
various producer services), delivery to final consumers, and final disposal after use” 
                                            
14 See Freeman (1987) and Nelson (1993) for example. NICs refer to the “newly industrialising countries”. 
15 See, for example, Oyeyinka (2005) 
INNOGEN Working Paper 69                                                             January 2009 
 
 13 
(Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001: 4). There are a number of distinctive features to this value 
chain approach. One is that the chain typically has deep routes into its supply base, and 
extended foliage in its links with varied tiers of intermediary processors and final 
consumers. Chain coordination is thus a key component of successful chain 
performance. Second, and related, the value chain framework is not just a heuristic 
taxonomy for recording flows of products, people and knowledge. The coordination 
which chains require involves power – the power of inclusion/exclusion, the setting and 
monitoring of chain performance standards, and the allocation of the division of labour in 
chain roles. Third, in the context of deepening globalisation, value chains are 
increasingly global, drawing not just on global suppliers, but targeting a global pool of 
global consumers. 
 
How might these two components of systems thinking influence the significance of a new 
genre of BRI? The point is that global value chains involve a consortium of firms and 
related organisations that are brought together in particular business configurations, 
targeting global markets in the search for economies of scale. The individual links in 
these chains represent the core competences of Henderson and Clark; the chain 
represents their architecture. Given that value chains are trust-intensive, these 
increasingly global system architectures are subject to path dependency, drawing on 
and incorporating a range of changing competences and players. The governance of 
these chains is largely in the hands of a relatively small number of TNCs who target 
global markets with global brands (Toyota, Loreal) and established delivery systems 
(MacDonalds). They invest vast sums in the sophisticated learning of the needs of their 
customer base and in aligning the business strategy of their chain organisation to 
meeting these needs. Although they differentiate their final offerings to meet the needs 
of culturally specific markets, as a general rule these differentiations are minor variations 
on a theme. For example, even within France, Nestle markets different blends between 
northern and southern regions. What they know much less about are the needs of 
different consumers, very different operating environments, and of the chain 
configurations which are best suited to meeting these new needs and operating 
conditions. The neglected needs which are most evident are those of very low income 
consumers in developing countries characterised by insecurity, volatility, and poor 
infrastructure.  
 
4.2.  Demand-led innovation  
 
Mode 1 innovation systems and their associated production structures are essentially 
supply-pushed systems. Producers make guesses (sometimes more informed than 
others) on what they think their final users will value. Mode 2 innovation systems, as we 
have seen, are more reflexive, drawing consumers into processes determining the 
prioritisation of research agendas. In some cases, by exercising financial muscle and 
using contract supply procedures, users pull required innovation from production 
systems; in other cases, producers proactively interact with users and other linked 
bodies in the development of suitable products and processes. 
 
This producer-user interaction is an essential characteristic of the relationship between 
the suppliers of capital and intermediate goods and their downstream user industries, 
and has been long-recognised (including in Pavitt’s taxonomy of innovation, Pavitt, 
1984). But, more recently, or perhaps more recently recognised, is the role which final 
consumers play in innovation processes. Effective final use often requires considerable 
learning, and as von Hippel has pointed out, the knowledge so produced is 
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asymmetrical; that is, the user knows much more about the product and its 
characteristics than does the producer. Moreover, much of this knowledge is path-
dependent and context-specific – “In the specific case of product development, this 
means that users as a class will tend to develop innovations that draw heavily on their 
own information about need and context of use” (von Hippel, 2005: 70). 
 
Thus, in an increasing number of sectors, “beta-vintages” are released at a deliberately 
premature stage of product development to lead-users, aided by the growing 
sophistication of real and virtual model-making technologies (such as CNC-controlled 
profilers). Firms “… sell platform products intentionally designed for post-sale 
modification by users” (von Hippel, 2005: 128). Lead users then refine the product, 
ironing out weaknesses, and attuning the product to specific market-niches, before 
suppliers proceed to large-scale production. Examples of user-led innovation classically 
include beta-releases of software, and Microsoft is famous (or perhaps infamous) for the 
retro fixing of software based on user experience. Von Hippel provides other examples 
of final-user led innovation in products based on the sophisticated knowledge of high-
income and technically-educated consumers. There are few documented cases of final-
user innovation involving low income consumers, or indeed of user-led innovations in 
systems (as opposed to core components of systems) as in health-delivery value chains. 
 
4.3.  The bottom of the pyramid 
 
One of the characteristics of the deepening globalisation which unfolded in the last few 
decades of the 20th century was that it was characterised by growing inequality. There 
are clear analytical explanations for this divergence in income streams – for those with 
rents (including, increasingly innovation rents), returns can be realised over large global 
markets; for those without rents, competition is increasingly intense and global in nature 
(Kaplinsky, 2005). The pursuit of these global rents has largely been driven by the core 
innovators in the high-income economies, producing differentiated versions of core 
products to cope with the characteristics of specific market. But, essentially these 
differentiated products are variants of a single core technology. The dominant innovators 
know, and exploit, their markets – middle and high-income consumers, not just in high-
income economies but also (as a consequence of growing inequality) in many low-
income economies as well. 
 
Yet, although it is true that as a global phenomenon, income inequality has worsened 
within and between countries, there has been a single major countervailing factor which 
has meant that, arguably at least, the population-weighted distribution of global income 
has not worsened (Milanovic, 2003). This has been a consequence of the very rapid and 
sustained growth in China, such that despite growing internal inequality, the rapid 
absolute income growth in a country with one-fifth of global population is such that it 
affects the global numbers living in particular income groups. China’s rapid and 
sustained growth is extensively documented, and India, too, has grown very rapidly 
since the early 1990s. Together these two countries account for almost 40 percent of the 
global population. Both countries have witnessed the very rapid growth of a new and 
very large class of consumers – often misnamed “the middle class” despite earning 
incomes which by high-income country standards would be classified as the “poor” – has 
been rapid and dramatic. As Figure 1 shows, in both China and India there has been a 
very rapid growth in the number of households with a collective annual income of more 
than $1,000 and less than $5,000, the primary community of “bottom of the pyramid 
cash-consumers. (Below $1,000 per household, disposable cash incomes are too low for 
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significant consumption). China has begun to also see significant growth in the number 
of households with an income of between $5,000 and $10,000. 
 
Figure 1. Households according to disposable income bracket in BRIC countries: 
2002/2007 '000 households 
 
Source: Euromonitor International from national statistics, cited in Media Eghbal  (2008), 
“BRIC economies withstand global financial crisis”, 5 Nov 2008, 
http://www.euromonitor.com/BRIC_economies_withstand_global_financial_crisis 
 
 
Prahalad and Hammond drew attention to the market potential of this new class of 
consumers (Prahalad and Hammond, 2002), pointing out that there was something in 
the region of 4 billion people living at per capita incomes below £2,000 p.a.. Together 
with Hammond, and in his subsequent book (Prahalad, 2005) Prahalad makes three key 
points which lead him to characterise this market as being “the fortune at the bottom of 
the pyramid”. First, although incomes are low, many of these people are active 
consumers of purchased goods and services. But their consumption is often much more 
socialised than that of higher income consumers. For example, cellular phone handsets 
in rural areas are shared amongst many users, rather than being individually owned. 
Second, many of the products which the poor consume make intensive use of radical 
new technologies, a departure from products classically highlighted in the appropriate 
technology literature. And third, and perhaps most radically, these poor consumers 
represent a market of growing significance and provide the potential for highly profitable 
production. Crucially, Prahalad sees this as providing a market opportunity for TNCs 
rather than for the SMEs and locally-owned firms long identified in the appropriate 
technology and informal sector literature as being key providers for low income 
consumers. 
 
 
5.  Below The Radar Innovation: Prospects For The Future? 
 
The original Sussex Manifesto was written in 1970 as an advisory document for UN 
policy during the “Second Development Decade”. In many ways it was ahead of its time 
and sought to raise issues that were not part of conventional policy discourse. 
Regrettably the SM did not really make the impact it deserved and time has gone on. 
Now 40 years ahead it is clear that the international context has changed considerably 
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raising important questions about the role of S/T in the new globalised 21st century. We 
have argued that until the late 20th century, the dominant mode of thinking about 
innovation was to characterise this as a challenge involving the application of science 
and technology (measured through R&D expenditures) to economic production. 
Organisationally this gave primacy to scientific and technological inquiry in institutions of 
higher learning, in RTOs and in the research laboratories of large firms. Conceptually 
this involved a linear conveyor-belt, loosely characterised as science  invention  
technology  production, beginning in the national system of innovation with very high 
level and disciplinary-specialised skills, and subsequently spreading to the productive 
sector where innovations were implemented by much lower level skills. In the 
innovations systems literature this was referred to as Mode 1 innovation. 
 
This Mode 1 innovation system began to run out of steam for a variety of reasons 
outlined in Section 3.  It has begun to be supplanted - at least in many high-income 
economies – by Mode 2 forms of organisation, involving greater enterprise-based 
technology development, a heavy input of low-level incremental change, greater 
interaction between the invention-development-production components of the 
innovation-cycle, the undermining of specialised disciplinary silos, and a transition from a 
supply-pushed innovative system to a user-pulled funding process. “Best-practice” 
thinking about innovation and development is thus increasingly geared towards the 
promotion of the Mode 2 framework. There is clearly considerable scope for gains to be 
realised through the promotion of increased enterprise- and farm-based innovative 
efforts, and the reflexive interaction among producing units, NGOs, RTOs and higher 
educational institutions. This policy agenda is increasingly widely recognised (albeit not 
widely implemented) – it is, to open the radar-metaphor, on the strategic radar screens 
of many private sector decisions-makers and policy makers in low income economies. 
 
However, at best, the rapid adoption of Mode 2 only offers the possibility of allowing 
innovation systems in low-income countries to arrest the growing innovation gap with 
high-income economies. It does little to challenge the hegemony of established 
hierarchies in global innovation processes. It does not address the challenge of meeting 
the needs of very low income consumers.  In some cases this means ignoring the 
demands of consumers who are happy with much lower levels of quality than the 
products produced for global markets (albeit with variation) by TNCs, and who often 
consume (collectively on occasions) in distinctively different patterns from the prevailing 
markets in the high-income countries and the high-income communities within low-
income economies. Nor does the Mode 2 model respond centrally to the need to 
develop and diffuse forms of production and service delivery which are appropriate to 
low income economies with poor and unreliable infrastructure and fragmented and 
seasonal markets. And nor does it meet the needs in many sectors (such as health, 
agriculture and education) of developing different distributional systems for the delivery 
of the products and services which they require.  
 
Finally, in key areas such as areas of life sciences, Mode 2 approaches may not resolve 
science policy challenges of redirecting investment in basic science to meet the 
challenges of the poor. For example, it is clear that after more than 10 years of 
investment in highly creative Mode 2 experiments in HIV vaccine research in 
organisations such as the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative, new approaches to basic 
science need to be explored. While product and clinical trials based approaches were 
positive in many respects they did not resolve the quandary of how to steer basic 
science, such as in cutting-edge systems biology, in such a way as to be relevant to 
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needs to the poor. The current debate over how to evaluate the work of the CGIAR 
centres and scientists is an indication of the same problem. Should CGIAR scientists 
and centres be evaluated through the quantitative metrics relating to citations and 
publication in world leading discipline journals or by their contribution to alleviating 
poverty and linking to MDGs? 
 
Given this we anticipate the development and diffusion of a new pattern of innovation in 
and for low income economies which we characterise as BRI.  A BRI approach might  
take the following forms  
 
• In terms of capabilities, it is premised on the reality of growing science and 
technological capabilities in low income economies in general, and in China and 
India (the two core Asian Driver economies) in particular. This follows many 
decades of investment in education and skill development, the growth of large 
and dynamic capital goods sectors, and growing expertise in innovation in 
business systems, though in poorer regions such as Africa and many parts of 
Latin America such capabilities largely remain to be built.  
 
• In terms of markets, rapid growth provides enormous incentives for innovation 
and for the reaping of economies of scale and scope (Verdoorn's Law, 
McCombie, 1986). However, distinctively this is a market of very low-income 
consumers, with associated trade-offs between price and product quality and 
variety. Since many of these consumers are also closely linked to the agricultural 
sector, incomes often vary seasonally. Large households and dense living also 
provide scope for less individualised and more shared and collective forms of 
consumption 
 
• In terms of production parameters, low labour costs provide the potential for less 
mechanised forms of production. Infrastructure is typically poor and unreliable, 
labour relations are distinctive, and in many cases skills amongst the labour force 
are also low. 
 
Many of these market and production characteristics are long-lived and underpin the 
long-term commitment towards appropriate technology; the new elements are the 
dynamic market conditions and the very substantial accretion of production, skill and  
 
Figure 2: Capabilities, markets and production structures underlying BRI 
 
Capabilities • Science, technology and project management skills 
• Capital goods 
• Business systems 
• Systemic technology development 
Markets • Rapid growth 
• Particularly rapid growth in low-income market segments 
• Collective consumption 
• Seasonal markets 
Production 
parameters 
• Low wages 
• Unreliable and poor infrastructure 
• Low skill levels 
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technological capabilities in low-income economies. As we observed above, a key 
feature of BRI is the collective significance of these various developments underlying 
innovation as a process. 
 
The likelihood, therefore, is for the development of new products in China and India 
aimed at these low-income markets. The product-process linkage inherent in many 
sectors – again, observed in the appropriate technology literature – leads to a clustering 
of production technologies which are similarly reflective of operating conditions in these 
low-income markets. This is not a development which is confined to goods (for example 
one child per laptop and wind-up computers), but also to services (for example, the 
provision of low cost rural health delivery incorporating a mix of western and traditional 
healers, and innovation in long-distance learning. Similarly, this interactive nexus of low-
income products and production technologies is not confined to the core component 
technologies identified by Henderson and Clark, but equally to the value chains within 
which they are embedded.  
 
Thus, we anticipate a new generation in innovation systems, with the core development 
of low-income economy specific products and processes being located in low-income 
economies, particularly China and India. Because of the context of their development, 
they are particularly appropriate for other low-income economies. We can already 
observe this in Africa, for example. Many of the professional elites examining the entry of 
China into the continent are dismissive of the very poor quality of many Chinese 
products. However, from the perspective of very poor consumers, a wireless costing $2 
may look and sound tinny, and may have a relatively limited lifespan. But it is cheap, and 
it is appropriate. Similarly on health, some generically produced drugs (such as those 
treating TB and malaria) may not have the same level of therapeutic benefit as the 
newest variants of treatment, but they are low-cost and will often minimise the worse 
aspects of a morbidity inducing condition such as chronic high blood pressure.   
 
But to what extent is this disruptive of established innovation hierarchies? Here it is 
helpful to turn to the ideas of Christenson whose writings on disruptive innovation have 
been so influential (Christenson;1997). Christenson addresses the failure of well-
performing companies to exploit the development of new technologies. His argument is 
essentially that these weakness flows directly from their core strengths which is that they 
invested considerable resources in acutely understanding the needs of their core 
customers. Thus when a new technology arrives which fails to address these known 
needs effectively, the major innovating firms are dismissive. For example, IBM neglected 
the arrival of the 51/4 floppy disc since it was hopelessly inadequate for the needs of its 
corporate customers who required vast quantities of data-storage. Its problem was that it 
knew its existing customer base too well, but had no feel for a new generation of much 
less demanding customers. As Christenson observed the previously dominant industry 
leaders “…..were as well-run as one could expect a firm managed by mortals to be – but 
that there is something about the way decisions get made in successful organisations 
what sows the seeds of eventual failure”. They failed precisely because they listened to 
their customers so well – “the logical, competent decisions of management that are 
critical to the success of their companies are also why they lose their positions of 
leadership“(Christenson, 1997: xiii). Christenson goes on to observe that “[b]y and large, 
disruptive technology is initially embraced by the least profitable customers in a market” 
(op. cit: xvii) 
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We are anticipating a similar process with regard to the new families of low-income 
goods and services associated with Asian-Driver based innovation. The disruption in this 
case is not the arrival of new technologies which drive the search for new markets, but 
the disruption provided by distinctively new types of consumers, based in low income 
countries. These markets induce innovation. But in the same way that IBM was oblivious 
to the significance of what subsequently came to represent an enormous market of 
distributed computing and memory-storage, so too the existing innovation leaders are 
unable to either recognise or exploit these dynamic new market opportunities. Their 
trajectories and market antennae inhibit them from fully recognising these new 
opportunities which are “below the radar”. Their cost structures – not just with regard to 
their core component technologies, but also the structure of their value chains - makes it 
difficult to address these markets, even if they are recognised. And their trajectories and 
routines place severe obstacles in their dynamic response to these new opportunities.  
 
In this critical disruptive sense, BRI flies in the face of Prahalad’s assertions that 
northern MNCs can effectively grasp the market opportunities which he correctly 
identified as arising from the growth of low income consumers in the Asian Driver 
economies. He argued that “[b]y stimulating commerce and development at the bottom 
of the economic pyramid, [northern-based] MNCs could radically improve the lives of 
billions of people… Achieving this goal does not require multinationals to spearhead 
global social development initiatives for charitable purposes. They need only act in their 
own self interest, for there are enormous business benefits to be gained by entering 
developing markets” (Prahalad and Hammond, 2002: 4). 
 
Of course there are parallels with the idea of BRI and the appropriate technology 
movement. In a sense BRI is the maturation of many of the ideas of the AT movement, 
including the idea of blending simple technologies with advanced technologies such as 
electronics and nanotechnology (Bhalla, 1984). What is different is that BRI involves the 
movement of appropriate innovation from the fringes of the growth process and from the 
purview of the NGO movement to the centre of the globally-dynamic segments of the 
global economy, the core of profit generation and appropriation in the corporate sector 
and the heart of social provision by the state in low income markets. Crucially, it is a 
process predominantly driven in low income economies, by low income economy firms 
and in some areas by the inclusion of (social and natural) scientists and technologists 
based in low income countries.  
 
To the extent that such a change in emphasis takes place it will be crucially necessary to 
incorporate appropriate institutional change within the publicly-financed knowledge 
system itself. For research institutes and higher education bodies in many low income 
economies are still largely operating as Mode 1 organisations. As such their impact on 
development is much less than it could be. For example, new entrepreneurs are often 
forced to rely on foreign technical inputs even in areas like simple food processing where 
local expertise should be available (Keskin et al; 2009). Similarly universities produce 
graduates for whom there are not only no jobs but also whose training is well below 
international standards. The best graduates then join the external brain drain and are 
effectively lost to the local economy.16 Possibilities for capacity building are also 
                                            
16
 In a recent Panorama TV programme looking at what happens to UK tax payers money as overseas aid 
one component asked soon-to-be graduates in Uganda where they wanted to work. The vast majority stated 
they wished to work for an international donor. We are grateful to Ian Maudlin and Andy Frost for drawing 
our attention to this point 
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diminished considerably. Hence while there has been a gradual movement towards 
Mode 2 patterns of institutional behaviour in the high income economies this has not 
really taken place in many of the poorest low income economies, especially in relation to 
their universities and agricultural development. Similar criticisms have been levelled at 
the use and abuse of international aid funding which appears to prop up research 
organisations (located in both rich and poor countries) and linked NGOs but with little 
obvious impact on ultimate users. And as mentioned above, even CGIAR institutes 
established with a specific developmental mandate are now under serious criticism for 
their apparent lack of impact.   
 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have tried to show that modern analyses of innovation policy for low 
income economies are still unduly focused on traditional (and in our view outdated) 
assumptions about the interactivity of science and economic production. .At the same 
time there has been little appreciation of the potential for change shown by economic 
systems in East and South Asia. The policy agenda must now shift towards 
understanding in much more detail the underlying dynamics of technology developments 
currently taking place in countries we have labelled the Asian Drivers where new 
patterns of institutional change and capacity building are evolving under the radar, so to 
speak. We also need to understand how this context of innovation may or may not make 
the resulting products and services, and the value chains in which they are delivered, 
appropriate to other low income economies. Some of the results of this understanding 
will undoubtedly make for uncomfortable reading since they will call in question many of 
our deeply held assumptions about the structure and functioning of established 
knowledge systems. Nevertheless the challenges are exciting since they hold out 
possibilities for a genuine breakthrough in international development. In this way 
perhaps poverty might indeed “become history.”  
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